Yoo's Professional Misconduct

Although Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis has decided that John Yoo's "poor judgment" did not rise to the level of professional misconduct, the issue is not yet settled, because what is essentially the same issue is being litigated in federal district court, and is now before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.

In the recently-released final report of the Office of Professional Responsibility within the U.S. Department of Justice, the OPR concluded that many of the misstatements and omissions in the legal memoranda that John Yoo (then in the Office of Legal Counsel) approved on the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" were intentional and constituted professional misconduct because he failed to provide legal advice that was thorough, objective, and candid. The OPR concluded that Yoo failed to provide the proper level of legal advice because he "put his desire to accommodate the client" (i.e., the policy makers in the Bush White House) above his professional obligations.

In rejecting the conclusion that the misstatements and omissions constituted professional misconduct, Assoc. Deputy Attorney General Margolis disagreed that Yoo wanted to tell the policy makers within the Bush administration what they wanted to hear, and concluded instead that Yoo was telling the Bush administration what Yoo wanted them to hear. "While I have declined to adopt OPR's findings of misconduct, I fear that John Yoo's loyalty to his own ideology and convictions clouded his view of his obligation to his client and led him to author opinions that reflected his own extreme, albeit sincerely held, views of executive power while speaking for an institutional client."

But is the sincerity of Yoo's ideology a defense to charges of professional misconduct?

That issue may be addressed in a federal district court action brought by Jose Padilla against John Yoo in which Padilla alleges that John Yoo's memos resulted in Padilla's imprisonment (and mistreatment). Padilla v. Yoo, No. 3:08-cv-00035-JSW (U.S.D.C. N.D. Cal.) Yoo moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that, among other things, he was a federal officer entitled to immunity to suit. In a ruling last June, the court ruled that Yoo was not entitled to immunity because the opinions expressed in Yoo's memos violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

The district court ruling is currently on appeal to the 9th Circuit (No. 09-16478), and one of the issues being argued is whether Padilla's complaint alleges facts that constitute unprofessional conduct by Yoo, and a brief filed by a group of professors of legal ethics say that it does. According to the "amicus" brief filed by "legal ethics scholars" last month, Padilla has alleged that Yoo "stepped beyond his role as a lawyer to participate directly in developing policy in the war on terrorism," and that allegation supports the conclusion that Yoo did not merely give "poor" or "incorrect" legal advice, but gave advice that violated ethical rules.

In other words, Margolis seems to believe that Yoo did not act unethically because he only allowed his own views to interfere with his obligation to give impartial legal advice, while the legal scholars filing the amicus brief with the 9th Circuit believe that Yoo acted unethically because he allowed his own views to interfere with his obligation to give impartial legal advice.

Now, the 9th Circuit is being asked to rule on allegations and not evidence, but the fact that the OPR has already concluded that Yoo's erroneous legal advice was not accidental but intentional suggests that Padilla will be able to prove the same thing. And Padilla may be able to avoid the mistake that the OPR may have made in assuming that Yoo gave bad legal advice to please the White House and failing to consider that Yoo might have given bad legal advice to please himself.

How Do Hate Crimes Affect Interstate Commerce?

And is there anything left that does not affect interstate commerce?

The question arises because the U.S. Constitution did not give Congress the power to legislate generally, over any subject, but only over the subjects listed in the Constitution, one of which is the regulation of interstate commerce.

And so, in S. 909, the "Matthew Shepard and and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act," which yesterday became part of the 2010 defense appropriate act (S. 1390), Congress dutifully found that violence motivated by bias "affects interstate commerce."

Really?

When the Constitution was first proposed and then ratified in the late 1700s, interstate commerce was relatively limited. Most food was grown within a few miles of where it was eaten, and most goods were manufactured locally, and by hand. The industrial revolution was just beginning, and the only means of transporting goods long distances was by horse-drawn wagon or by sea.

As our economy has grown larger and more complicated, the importance of interstate commerce has also grown. Today, it's difficult to find anything in any store that was not either grown or manufactured in a different state or includes materials from a different state. And as interstate commerce grew, the power of Congress grew, so that Congress began regulating not just railroads and the interstate movement of goods, but also agriculture, manufacturing, working conditions, and product safety.

When it involves interstate commerce, Congress can legislate against discrimination and bias. The Civil Rights Act of 1965, which made it illegal for hotels, restaurants, and other public accommodations to discriminate based on race was based on the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, because there is no power in Congress to legislate against discrimination generally. (The 14th Amendment prohibits states from denying equal protection and does not prohibit private discrimination.) Later legislation has prohibited discrimination in housing and employment, and has extended to not just racial discrimination but also discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, religion, and disabilities.

I agree with all of this. We have a national economy, and we should have national laws regulating that economy. But do two homophobes beating up a gay man outside of a bar really affect the national economy?

According to Congress, it does. Section 2 of S. 909 states (in part) that violence motivated by bias:

substantially affects interstate commerce in many ways, including the following:

(A) The movement of members of targeted groups is impeded, and members of such groups are forced to move across State lines to escape the incidence or risk of such violence.

(B) Members of targeted groups are prevented from purchasing goods and services, obtaining or sustaining employment, or participating in other commercial activity.

(C) Perpetrators cross State lines to commit such violence.

(D) Channels, facilities, and instrumentalities of interstate commerce are used to facilitate the commission of such violence.

(E) Such violence is committed using articles that have traveled in interstate commerce.

The statute itself limits the crimes relating to gender, religious, gender identity, and other biases to those occurring "during the course of, or as the result of, the travel of the defendant or the victim--(I) across a State line or national border; or (II) using a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce," those committed using a "channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce" or using a "firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive or incendiary device, or other weapon that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce," and those that "interferes with commercial or other economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the time of the conduct" or "otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce."

It's difficult to imagine any crime of violence, anywhere, that wouldn't fall under one of those categories. For example, it's pretty safe to say that guns, knives, and even baseball bats are manufactured and sold in interstate commerce, so any crime, committed with any gun, knife, or baseball bat that ever crossed any state line, can now be a federal crime.

And my hypothetical about two homophobes beating up a gay man outside of a bar is a crime falling within the new statute if the fight arose after the victim bought a beer in the bar (which is interstate commerce) or caused the victim to miss a day of work (which affects interstate commerce).

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), is often cited as limiting Congressional power, because in that case the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a law that made it a crime to carry a gun within a "school zone," rejecting arguments raised by the government that violence near schools will affect interstate commerce. However, the statute in question did not include any specific requirement that the crime be found to be "in interstate commerce" or "affect interstate commerce," and there were no findings by Congress about how the presence of guns near schools would affect interstate commerce, so the decision could be distinguished from S. 909 and it is not clear how the Supreme Court will react to "findings" and statutory "limits" like those found in S. 909.

One would think that there is a limit to congressional power, and that Congress cannot extend its power merely because the crime is carried out using some weapon that once crossed a state line, or because of some relatively minor and unintended economic consequence of the crime. But maybe not.

Yoo, Torture Memos, and "Reasonable Officials"

On June 12, a federal judge has issued a stinging rebuke to John Yoo for the opinions he wrote for the Bush administration supporting indefinite detentions and "harsh interrogations." The judge ruled that Yoo's opinions were not merely wrong, but were unreasonably wrong when applied to an American citizen classified as an "enemy combatant."

This should be the first of many judicial opinions that forcefully and unequivocably reject the reasoning of Yoo's "torture memos."

The ruling was in a civil action filed by Jose Padilla against John Yoo in which Padilla has claimed that Yoo's legal opinions, written by Yoo while he was serving in the Department of Justice, caused Padilla to be deprived of civil rights. The complaint alleges unconstitutional detention without due process of law and mental and physical abuse. In rejecting Yoo's claim of immunity from personal liability for acts he performed while an official of the federal government, the judge held that Yoo's legal opinions were unreasonably wrong because Padilla's constitutional rights were "clearly established."

Some background: Jose Padilla is a citizen of the United States who was arrested at Chicago's O'Hare airport, initially charged with conspiracy to construct a "dirty" (i.e., radioactive) bomb, but then turned over to the military who held him in near-solitary confinement for almost four years before he was finally returned to the civilian courts where he pled guilty to crimes less serious than the ones he was initially charged with. (He could not have been convicted of the crimes for which he was originally charged because the original charges were dismissed "with prejudice" when the Bush administration insisted he be surrendered to military custody, and so the dismissal barred any future prosecution for the same crimes due to the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy for the same offense.)

John Yoo was an official of the White House, and then the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, and his legal opinions formed the basis for the Bush adminstrations claims of the powers of the President to order detentions and "harsh interrogations" notwithstanding constitutional guarantees of due process and statutory prohibitions against torture.

In 2008, and after his conviction, Padilla and his mother filed suit against Yoo, claiming that as a result of Yoo's legal opinions Padilla had been detained without charge and without access to legal counsel and had been subjected to severe and prolonged isolation, sleep deprivation, extreme temperatures, painful stress positions, threats of death, and other forms of physical and mental abuse. Padilla and his mother asked for a judgment that those conditions were unlawful and unconstitional, for $1 (one dollar) in damages, and for other relief. Padilla v. Yoo, No. 3:08-cv-00035-JSW (U.S.D.C. N.D. Cal. 1/4/2008).

After some procedural sparring, Yoo moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a proper cause of action. In deciding this motion, the court did not decide whether what Padilla claimed was true, but merely whether Padilla could win the lawsuit against Yoo if it turned out that everything that Padilla had alleged was actually true. In deciding this motion, the court addressed two major issues:

1. Whether there is a cause of action and legal remedy in court for these kinds of allegations; and, if there is a cause of action

2. Whether the action is foreclosed by the usual immunity of government officials from any personal financial liability for their actions performed in the course of their duties.

On the first issue, the court ruled that the decision of the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which held that a lawsuit could exist for violations of the constitution, required the court to find a civil remedy for Padilla even though neither the Constitution nor any federal statute expressly stated that Padilla could sue Yoo. (This is an issue that will almost certainly be contested on appeal.)

On the second and at present more interesting issue, the court pointed out that the immunity of government officials for personal liability is a "qualified" immunity, which means that the official is immune unless their conduct violates "any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a resonable person would have known." The court then stated that, in determining whether a government official should be held personally liable for questioned conduct, the issue was "whether, under that clearly established law, a reasonable official could have believed that the conduct was lawful." Applying that standard to the allegations made by Padilla against Yoo, the court then reached the following conclusions:

1. Yoo could be held responsible for deprivations of constitutional rights consistent with his legal opinions because "government lawyers are responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their conduct" and Padilla alleged circumstances that made his mistreatment reasonably foreseeable by Yoo.

2. Padilla sufficiently alleged that his constitutional rights were violated by denial of access to courts in violation of the 5th Amendment and cruel and unusual treatments that would be violations of the 8th Amendment.

3. Padilla's constitutional rights were "clearly established." In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected Yoo's arguments that the presidential designation of Padilla as an "enemy combatant" created any uncertainty about Padilla's constitutional rights.

The necessary, if not explicit, implication of the court's holdings is that Yoo's legal conclusions were not just wrong, but were not the conclusions of a "reasonable" federal officer. Padilla v. Yoo, No. 3:08-cv-00035-JSW (U.S.D.C. N.D. Cal. 6/12/2009).

Still to come is the report of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel on whether the opinions of John Yoo and Jay Bybee departed from professional standards to such an extent that they should be disciplined for failing to adhere to the rules of professional conduct.

Antonin, Get Your Gun

The Supreme Court's recent decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07–290 (6/26/2008), has garnered a lot of attention as a confirmation of the 2nd Amendment's "right to keep and bear arms." But there is both less to the opinion, and more to the opinion, than first meets the eye.

The jurisprudential weaknesses of the majority opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia are beyond the scope of this blog posting (I may elaborate later), but the actual holding of the case, and the true effect of the opinion, need to be explained more fully than has been covered in the popular press to date.

Although the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment's "right of the People to keep and bear arms" was an individual right and not a right of the states to maintain militias, and held that a ban on handguns violated the Second Amendment, the holding of the case was still relatively narrow because the law in question was an ordinance of the District of Columbia and not a statute enacted by one of the states.

The District of Columbia is a peculiar place, constitutionally speaking, because it is governed by Congress in accordance with Article I, Section 8, clause 17, of the Constitution, and is not a "state" (or a part of any state) within the meaning of the Constitution. That peculiarity is important because, technically speaking, the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the Constitution, including the 2nd Amendment) are binding only on the federal government and not the states. The fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights apply to the states only through the 14th Amendment's guarantee of due process of law. So (for example), a state law that violates the right to freedom speech is not, technically speaking a violation of the 1st Amendment, which only applies to the federal government, but is a violation of the 14th Amendment.

In the Heller case, Scalia's opinion specifically recognized that the question of whether 2nd Amendment rights were "incorporated" into the 14th Amendment (and so applicable to the states) was not before the court, and that the court had previously ruled that the 2nd Amendment did not apply to the states. This is explicit in footnote 23, discussing a statement in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553 (1876) that stated that the 2nd Amendment only limited the power of Congress, and was not incorporated into the 14th Amendment:

With respect to Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation, a question not presented by this case, we note that Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases. Our later decisions in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 265 (1886) and Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535, 538 (1894), reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government.

Slip Opinion, page 48, note 23 (emphasis added).

This footnote says (and suggests) several things.

First, the question of whether the 2nd Amendment applies to state legislation was not before the court in Heller and was not decided, and so remains an open question.

Second, the Supreme has in past decisions (Presser and Miller) affirmed that the 2nd Amendment applies only the federal government.

Third, that Cruikshank (and perhaps later decisions) did not interpret the 14th Amendment in the same way that later decisions interpreted that amendment.

The third point, combined with Scalia's citations to statements made in Congress during the debates over the 14th Amendment that the 2nd Amendment represented a "fundamental right" enjoyed by American citizens (see pages 41-47), are clear signals that Scalia believes the 2nd Amendment does apply to the states, and is just waiting for right case in which to make that decision.

Mukasey Confirmed

Michael B. Mukasey has not yet been confirmed as Attorney General, but his most recent testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee (on 10/18/2007) have confirmed that he is indeed the "moral idiot" that I described earlier.

Asked whether "waterboarding" (the controlled drowning of detainees to obtain information) might be constitutional, Mukasey answered (evasively) that, "“If waterboarding is torture, torture is not constitutional.” Mukasey either does not know, or does not care, that a Japanese officer, Yukio Asano, was tried and convicted of war crimes in 1947, and sentenced to 15 years hard labor, because he waterboarded a U.S. civilian during the second world war.

Just as troubling (or perhaps more troubling) is that Mukasey adheres to the view that the President as commander-in-chief under Article II of the Constitution can ignore the laws enacted by Congress under Article I of the Constitution. So electronic surveillance carried out on the orders of the President might be legal even if prohibited (and made a criminal act) by the laws enacted by Congress. According to Mukasey, “The president is not putting somebody above the law; the president is putting somebody within the law.”

Or, as Richard Nixon put it, ""When the president does it, that means that it is not illegal."